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We introduce a probabilistic framework that represents stylized banking networks with the aim of predicting the size
of contagion events. Most previous work on random financial networks assumes independent connections between
banks, whereas our framework explicitly allows for (dis)assortative edge probabilities (e.g., a tendency for small banks
to link to large banks). We analyze default cascades triggered by shocking the network and find that the cascade can
be understood as an explicit iterated mapping on a set of edge probabilities that converges to a fixed point. We derive
a cascade condition that characterizes whether or not an infinitesimal shock to the network can grow to a finite size
cascade, in analogy to the basic reproduction number R0 in epidemic modelling. The cascade condition provides an
easily computed measure of the systemic risk inherent in a given banking network topology. Using the percolation
theory for random networks we also derive an analytic formula for the frequency of global cascades. Although the
analytical methods are derived for infinite networks, we demonstrate using Monte Carlo simulations the applicability
of the results to finite-sized networks. We show that edge-assortativity, the propensity of nodes to connect to similar
nodes, can have a strong effect on the level of systemic risk as measured by the cascade condition. However, the
effect of assortativity on systemic risk is subtle, and we propose a simple graph theoretic quantity, which we call the
graph-assortativity coefficient, that can be used to assess systemic risk.
I. INTRODUCTION
The study of contagion in financial systems is topical in
light of the recent global credit crisis and the resultant dam-
age inflicted on financial institutions. Contagion1 refers to the
spread of dangerous shocks through a system of financial in-
stitutions, with each successive shock causing increasing pres-
sure on the remaining components of the system. The term
systemic risk refers to the contagion-induced threat to the fi-
nancial system as a whole, due to the failure of one (or more)
of its component institutions.
Over time, the nature of such contagious shocks has been a
topic of active discussion, with a growing list of channels such
as funding illiquidity, asset fire sales and collateral shocks,
that extend beyond the standard default or insolvency chan-
nel. For clarity in this paper, we adhere to the main body of
systemic risk modelling, and focus only on the default chan-
nel.
It is widely held that financial systems (see Ref. 2 and refer-
ences therein), defined for example as the collection of banks
and financial institutions in a developed country, can be mod-
elled as a random network of nodes or vertices with stylized
balance sheets, connected by directed links or edges that rep-
resent exposures or interbank loans, each edge with a positive
weight that represents the size of the exposure. If ever a node
becomes insolvent and ceases to operate as a bank, it will cre-
ate balance sheet shocks to other nodes, creating the poten-
tial of chains of insolvency that we will call default cascades.
Financial networks are difficult to observe because interbank
data is often not publicly available, but studies have indicated
that they share characteristics of other types of technological
and social networks, such as the World Wide Web and Face-
book. For example, the degree distributions of financial net-
works are thought to be fat-tailed since a significant number
of banks are very highly connected. A less studied feature ob-
served in financial networks (and as it happens, also the World
Wide Web) is that they have high negative assortativity3. This
refers to the property that any bank’s counterparties (i.e., their
graph neighbours) have a tendency to be banks of an opposite
character. For example, it is observed that small banks tend
to link preferentially to large banks rather than other small
banks. Commonly, social networks are observed to have pos-
itive rather than negative assortativity. Structural characteris-
tics such as degree distribution and assortativity are felt to be
highly relevant to the propagation of contagion in networks
but the nature of such relationships is far from clear4.
Our aim here is to develop a mathematical framework that
will be able to determine the systemic susceptibility in a rich
class of infinite random network models with enough flexi-
bility to include the most important structural characteristics
of real financial networks, in particular with general degree
distributions and a prescribed edge-assortativity. Our start-
ing point will be the Gai-Kapadia (GK) cascade model5 and
the analytical methods developed there and in Ref. 6 for that
model. The basic assumptions introduced in the GK model
are:
1. The network is a large (actually infinite) random di-
rected graph with a prescribed degree distribution;
2. Each node (bank) is labeled with a stylized banking bal-
ance sheet that identifies its external assets and liabili-
ties, its internal (i.e., total interbank) assets and liabil-
ities, and γ, its net worth or equity (i.e., its total as-
sets minus its total liabilities). Initially, the system is in
equilibrium, meaning each node has positive net worth
γ > 0;
3. Each directed edge is labeled with a deterministic
weight that represents the positive exposure of one bank
to another. These weights depend deterministically on
the in-degree of the edge, and are consistent with the
interbank assets and liabilities at each node;
4. A random shock is applied to the balance sheets in the
system that triggers the default or insolvency of a fixed
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fraction of nodes;
5. The residual value of an interbank exposure available to
creditors of a defaulted bank is zero, and thus the shock
has the potential to trigger a cascade of further bank
defaults.
The principle of limited liability for banks means that share-
holders are never asked to cover a negative net worth of an in-
solvent firm. Instead, the insolvent firm is assumed to default.
This means it ceases to operate as a going concern, sharehold-
ers are wiped out, and its creditors divide the residual value.
Since this residual value is always less than the nominal lia-
bilities, creditor banks thus receive a shock to their balance
sheets, which creates the potential for a default cascade. The
GK model makes a very simple zero recovery assumption that
residual values of defaulted banks will be zero, and thus every
time a bank defaults a maximal possible shock will be trans-
mitted to its creditors.
Our paper makes the following contributions towards de-
veloping a mathematical theory of systemic risk.
1. We generalize the GK model in an important respect,
namely that the edge degree distribution Q is arbitrary,
allowing for any desired amount of assortativity in the
network.
2. We present a simple algorithm for constructing general
assortative random directed graphs of the configuration
class.
3. We provide formulas for the expected cascade size, the
frequency of global cascades, and the spectral cascade
condition.
4. We introduce the concept of graph assortativity for di-
rected graphs that can be used to assess systemic risk.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In
Sec. II, we introduce our model. In Sec. III, we present our
analytical results, including the calculation of the expected
cascade size, the cascade condition, and a formula for the
frequency of large scale cascades. In Sec. IV, we compare
numerical results of Monte Carlo simulations with the analyt-
ical predictions of Sec. III for several examples of networks
generated using our model. Section V concludes.
II. THE BANKING NETWORKMODEL
In this section we specify the two constituent parts of our
interbank model: network structure and dynamics. The struc-
ture or skeleton of the network is modelled as a random di-
rected graph. The dynamics is determined by the bank balance
sheets and the rules for the propagation of defaults through the
interbank network.
A. The Assortative Skeleton Network
The first step in building a financial network is to build the
skeleton random directed graph where nodes represent banks
and edges represent interbank loans. Our construction is an
extension of the well-known configuration graph model7, and
to describe it we introduce the following definitions and nota-
tion:
1. A node v has type ( j, k) means its in-degree, the number
of in-pointing edges, is j and its out-degree is k.
2. An edge ` is said to have type (k, j) with out-degree k
and in-degree j if it is an out-edge of a node with out-
degree k and an in-edge of a node with in-degree j.
3. We write E+v (or E−v ) for the set of out-edges (respec-
tively, in-edges) of a given node v. We write v+` (or v
−
` )
for the node for which ` is an out-edge (respectively, in-
edge). In other words, edge ` starts from v+` and ends at
v−` .
4. Let P jk be the probability of a type ( j, k) node. This dis-
tribution has marginals P+k :=
∑
j P jk and P−j :=
∑
k P jk,
and mean in- and out-degree z =
∑
j jP−j =
∑
k kP+k .
5. Let Qk j be the probability of a type (k, j) edge. This
distribution has marginals Q+k :=
∑
j Qk j and Q−j :=∑
k Qk j.
FIG. 1. The network neighborhood of a bank v which has type
( j = 3, k = 2), since it has 3 debtors and 2 creditors in the inter-
bank network. Edge ` has type (k = 1, j = 3), since it is an out-edge
of a node with out-degree 1 and an in-edge of a node with in-degree
3.
Figure 1 illustrates the neighborhood of a type ( j = 3, k =
2) node. Arrows point from debtor to creditor banks, so that
default contagion propagates along the edge directions.
To define an ensemble of directed configuration graphs with
N nodes and joint distributions of node types P and edge types
Q the following consistency conditions should hold for each j
and k
• NP jk ∈ Z, NzQk j ∈ Z,
• Q+k = kP+k /z, Q−j = jP−k /z.
(1)
Here, the first condition states that there must be an inte-
ger number of nodes and edges, while the second condition
ensures that the number of edges of different types corre-
sponds exactly to the degrees of nodes. Under these condi-
tions, we use the following algorithm to construct a directed
edge-assortative graph from our ensemble:
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1. Make a list of N nodes of which exactly NP jk are of
type ( j, k) and a list of zN edges of which exactly NzQk j
have type (k, j). We refer to the unpaired in (out) arrows
of each node and edge as j-stubs (or k-stubs).
2. While there are unmatched stubs
• Pick an unmatched edge at random. Let its type
be (k, j).
• Match its j-stub to a random unpaired j-stub of
a node, chosen uniformly at random from un-
matched j-stubs.
• Match its k-stub to a random unpaired k-stub of
a node, chosen uniformly at random from un-
matched k-stubs.
Node of type
(j'=4,k=2)
Node of type
(j=3,k'=1)
Edge of type
(k=2,j=3)
FIG. 2. Stub-matching during the network construction process. The
k-stub of an unmatched edge of type (k = 2, j = 3) is matched to
an unmatched k-stub of one node, while the j-stub of the edge is
matched to an unmatched j-stub of another node.
Two recent papers, Refs. 8 and 9, have explored the class of
Assortative Configuration Graphs, and proposed more com-
plex simulation algorithms that do not rely on the rationality
of P,Q in (1). The algorithm we propose here is easy to un-
derstand, and adequate for our purposes.
We illustrate the stub-matching process in Fig. 2. It is im-
portant to recognize that this graph construction may lead for
finite N to self-edges as well as multiple edges between node
pairs. Such anomalies do not seriously affect finance interpre-
tations and occur with vanishing probability as N → ∞. The
property of configuration graphs in the N → ∞ limit, called
the locally tree-like (LT) property, is that cycles of any fixed
finite length occur only with zero probability: This has been
recently proven in Ref. 9.
The special case Qk j = k jP−j P
+
k /z
2 = Q−j Q
+
k corresponds
to edge uncorrelated directed graphs where in and out degrees
of an edge are independent from each other. Such graphs can
be constructed using a simpler algorithm: one lists j and k-
stubs of all nodes, and then j-stubs are matched to k-stubs
uniformly at random. We are interested in the general assor-
tative case described above because real financial networks
appear to have negative edge-assortativity, in that high degree
banks attach preferentially to low degree banks3.
A natural measure of edge-assortativity by degree is the
edge-assortativity coefficient rQ ∈ [−1, 1] given by
rQ =
∑
jk jk[Qk j − Q−j Q+k ]√(∑
j j2Q−j − (
∑
j jQ−j )2
) (∑
k k2Q+k − (
∑
k kQ+k )
2
) .
(2)
This is of course the Pearson correlation for Qk j viewed as a
bivariate probability distribution. We will soon find some ev-
idence that systemic risk of a network may be more strongly
related to a combination of edge- and node-assortativity (aris-
ing from the dependence between in- and out- degrees of
nodes). We therefore also define a measure we call the graph-
assortativity coefficient r ∈ [−1, 1] given by
r =
∑
j j′ j j′[B j j′ − B−j B+j′ ]√(∑
j j2B−j − (
∑
j jB−j )2
) (∑
j′ j′2B+j′ − (
∑
j′ j′B+j′ )2
) ,
(3)
where
B j j′ =
∑
k
P jk
P+k
Q j′k
is the joint distribution of the in-degree of pairs of nodes con-
nected by an edge and B−j =
∑
j′ B j j′ , B+j′ =
∑
j B j j′ are the
marginals.
B. Contagion Dynamics
To build a financial network with full accounting informa-
tion, consistent with a given skeleton graph, one specifies the
external assets Yv and external liabilities Dv for each node v,
and for each edge ` of the network, an exposure size or weight
w`. Then the interbank assets are Zv =
∑
`∈E−v w` and interbank
assets are Xv =
∑
`∈E+v w`. The net worth or equity of a node v
is defined to be its total assets minus total liabilities:
γv = Yv + Zv − Dv − Xv . (4)
In Fig. 3, we show the schematic balance sheet. By limited
liability, the solvency condition for a bank v is γv > 0. We will
always assume that the system is initially in an equilibrium
state in which all banks are solvent. Thus γv is a capital buffer
that keeps the bank solvent when subjected to balance sheet
shocks up to a certain size.
FIG. 3. Balance sheet of a bank v with 3 debtors and 2 creditors.
The net worth (or capital buffer) γv of the bank is its assets less its
liabilities.
The cascade dynamics that we specify below do not depend
on full accounting information, but only on the information
about the buffers γ and edge weights w. The analytical results
of our paper hold for default buffers γ jk that may depend on
the node type ( j, k), and the edge weights w j that may depend
on the edge in-degree.
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Insolvencies arise in a system initially in equilibrium only
when a shock causes at least one node to suffer a loss larger
than its buffer γv. For simplicity, we suppose that such an
initial shock to our system causes an initial set M0 of nodes
to become insolvent (for example by hitting their external as-
sets), but leaves other banks’ balance sheets unchanged. The
set M0 is drawn randomly, with the fraction of type ( j, k)
nodes that are defaulted denoted by ρ(0)jk .
Under the zero recovery assumption that an insolvent bank
can pay none of its interbank credit obligations, each insol-
vent node v triggers all its out-edges to have zero value. This
triggering of edges to default is an instance of what we call
an edge update step of the cascade: for any set of defaulted
nodes M we find a default edge set D which is composed
only of edges originating from nodesM.
Each such defaulted edge ` now transmits a maximal shock
w` to the asset side of the balance sheet of its end-node v−`
(the creditor bank). A solvent bank becomes defaulted if the
total shock received by the bank from all its defaulted debtors
exceeds its buffer. Hence the insolvency condition on a ( j, k)-
type node v is
γ jk ≤
∑
`∈E−v
1{`∈D} w j ,
whereD is a set of defaulted edges, and the indicator function
1A of a set A is 1 on the set and 0 on its complement. We call
this triggering of nodes to default a node update step of the
cascade: for the default edge set D we find a default node set
M′ defined by the condition v ∈ M′ if and only if
#{E−v ∩D} ≥ M jk := dγ jk/w je , (5)
where ( j, k) is the type of node v. Here dxe denotes the ceiling
function, i.e., the smallest integer greater than or equal to x,
and so M jk is the threshold for the number of defaulted in-
edges that will cause a type ( j, k) node to default.
To summarize, our banking system is specified by a skele-
ton random directed graph (defined by the number of nodes
N and the probabilities P jk, Qk j for node and edge types),
the accounting information (bank default buffers γ jk and in-
terbank loan amounts w j) and the initial default probabilities
ρ(0)jk for each bank type (resulting in the randomly-drawn initial
shocked setM0). Given any realization of a shocked financial
system so specified, the default cascade will be an alternating
sequence of edge and node updates, beginning withM0.
III. ANALYTICAL RESULTS
A. Expected cascade size
In this section, we calculate the expected fraction of de-
faulted nodes and edges in an asymptotically large network.
Given any realization of a shocked financial system as speci-
fied above, with an initial shocked setM0, the default cascade
can be thought of as a sequence of updates:
D1

D2

D3

M0
==
M1
==
M2
;;
M3 · · ·
Inductively, we have nondecreasing sequences of sets for n ≥
1:
Dn := defaulted edges triggered by nodes inMn−1, (6)
Mn := defaulted nodes triggered by edges inDn. (7)
We define ρ(n)jk as the probability that a type ( j, k) node is in
the default setMn, and probabilities σ(n)k and a(n)j that respec-
tively an edge with out-degree k and an edge with in-degree
j are in the default set Dn. To calculate these probabilities,
we use a simple but powerful recursive approach for solving
cascade-type dynamics on random network models10–12.
Consider a type ( j, k) node and calculate its default proba-
bility ρ(n)jk for n ≥ 1. The node is either initially defaulted with
probability ρ(0)jk , or it is initially not defaulted with probability
1 − ρ(0)jk . In the latter case, it will default if it has sufficiently
many defaulted in-edges. Each of its j in-edges is defaulted
with probability a(n)j . From the locally tree-like property of
the skeleton in the limit N → ∞, we deduce that the states
of the in-edges of a node are independent from each other.
Therefore, the probability of exactly m out of j in-edges to be
is the binomial probability
(
j
m
)
(a(n)j )
m(1 − a(n)j ) j−m. These m
defaulted edges cause the default of the node if m is at least
M jk = dγ jk/w je (see Eq. (5)). Hence, adding all probabilities
together gives
ρ(n)jk = ρ
(0)
jk + (1 − ρ(0)jk )
j∑
m=M jk
(
j
m
)
(a(n)j )
m(1 − a(n)j ) j−m. (8)
Next, to calculate σ(n+1)k , the probability that an edge with
out-degree k is defaulted at step n + 1, we take an edge with
out-degree k and look at its source node which (by the defi-
nition) has out-degree k. This is a type ( j, k) node with con-
ditional probability P jk/P+k and if so, it is defaulted at step n
with probability ρ(n)jk . Hence,
σ(n+1)k =
∑
j
ρ(n)jk
P jk
P+k
, (9)
where the sum is over possible in-degrees j of the source node.
Similarly, the probability that an edge with in-degree j is
defaulted at step n + 1 is given by
a(n+1)j =
∑
k
σ(n+1)k
Qk j
Q−j
, (10)
where Qk j/Q−j is the probability that the edge has out-degree
k, given its in-degree is j. An edge of type (k, j) is defaulted
with probability σk and we sum over all possible k.
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Starting with a given fraction of initially defaulted nodes
ρ(0)jk , we begin by computing the collections σ
(1)
k , a
(1)
j using (9)
and (10) . Thereafter, we can iterate Eqs. (8)-(10) to obtain
the values of ρ(n)jk , σ
(n+1)
k , a
(n+1)
j , for n ≥ 1.
In the case of edge-uncorrelated directed networks when
Qk j = Q+kQ
−
j , the quantities a
(n)
j no longer depend on j and
Eqs. (8)-(10) simplify to
ρ(n)jk = ρ
(0)
jk + (1 − ρ(0)jk )
j∑
m=M jk
(
j
m
)
(a(n))m(1 − a(n)) j−m , (11)
a(n+1) =
∑
j,k
k
z
P jkρ
(n)
jk . (12)
B. The Cascade Condition
We can derive a cascade condition which implies that a
generic infinitesimally small fraction ρ(0)jk of defaulted nodes
will result in a cascade of finite size. Writing Eqs. (8)-(10) in
vector form as
a¯(n+1) = {G j(a¯(n))} , (13)
where a¯(n) = {a(n)j }, an infinitesimally small seed may only
grow if the Jacobian matrix D j j′ = ∂G j/∂a j′ |0 has an expand-
ing direction, i.e., at least one eigenvalue with magnitude big-
ger than 1. In Sec. IV, we shall see that the cascade condition
is indeed a strong measure of systemic risk in simulated net-
works.
The derivatives D j j′ are easy to calculate. From Eq. (8)
∂ρ(n)jk
∂a(n)j
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
a(n)j =0
=
j∑
m=M jk
(
j
m
)
(a(n)j )
m−1(1 − a(n)j ) j−m−1(m − a(n)j j)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
a(n)j =0
=
(
j
M jk
)
(1 − a(n)j ) j−M jk (a(n)j )M jk−1M jk
∣∣∣∣∣∣
a(n)j =0
= j1{γ jk≤w j}. (14)
Combining Eqs. (9) and (10), and substituting Eq. (14), the
linearization of G j(a¯(n)) around zero is
G j(a¯(n)) =
∑
k
Qk j
Q−j P
+
k
∑
j′
P j′kρ
(n)
j′k
≈
∑
k
Qk j
Q−j P
+
k
∑
j′
P j′k j′1{γ j′k≤w j′ }a
(n)
j′ , (15)
which yields
D j j′ =
∂G j
∂a j′
∣∣∣∣∣∣
0
=
∑
k
j′Qk jP j′k1{γ j′k≤w j′ }
Q−j P
+
k
. (16)
Finite size cascades are possible when the spectral radius (the
largest eigenvalue in absolute value) of matrix {D j j′ } exceeds
one:
||D|| > 1. (17)
In the case of uncorrelated edge degrees (i.e., Qk j = Q+kQ
−
j ),
a j no longer depends on j and the cascade condition is simply∑
j,k
jk
z
P jk1{γ jk≤w j} > 1 , (18)
a result that has been derived previously in a rather differ-
ent fashion5,13. This formula extends the percolation theory
approach from undirected networks14 to the case of directed
nonassortative networks. We will see in the next section that
the percolation approach to the cascade condition also extends
to our directed assortative networks.
We can understand the cascade condition more clearly by
introducing the notion of vulnerable node, that is any node
that defaults if any one of its debtors (in-neighbours) defaults.
In our specifications, a ( j, k) node is thus vulnerable if and
only if its capital buffer is less or equal to the weight of its
in-links, i.e., γ jk ≤ w j. The matrix element D j j′ has a simple
explanation that gives more intuition about the nature of the
cascade condition: it is the expected number of edges with
in-degree j that emanate from a vulnerable node reached by
following an edge with in-degree j′.
C. Frequency of global cascades and the giant
vulnerable cluster
The cascade condition that tells us that global cascades are
possible turns out to be equivalent to the existence of a giant
vulnerable cluster in the interbank network. When the cas-
cade condition is satisfied, the default of a single bank will
result in a global cascade if the bank belongs to the so-called
in-component of the giant vulnerable cluster. Hence, the fre-
quency of global cascades is bounded from below (and as it
turns out well approximated by) by the fractional size of the
in-component (see Chapter 13.11 of Ref. 15).
FIG. 4. Schematic structure of the network with arrows represent-
ing the propagation of default. The default of any bank in the in-
component I will trigger the default of all nodes in the strongly con-
nected vulnerable cluster S , as well as the vulnerable nodes in the
out-component of S .
Let us define the following (see Fig. 4):
• V is the set of vulnerable nodes;
• S ⊂ V is the giant strongly connected set of vulnerable
nodes (called the giant vulnerable cluster);
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• I ⊃ S is the in-component of the giant vulnerable clus-
ter: the set of (possibly not vulnerable) nodes that are
connected to S by a directed path through vulnerable
nodes;
• Γ jk = 1{γ jk≤w j} is the indicator function that gives 1 if
type ( j, k) nodes are vulnerable and 0 otherwise.
The default of any node in the in-component I will cause the
default of the entire strongly connected component S. We
consider b¯ = {bk}where bk is the probability that a node with k
out-neighbours is not in the in-component I. Note that v ∈ Ic
(i.e., the complement of I) is equivalent to the condition that
all the downstream nodes are in the set Vc ∪ (V ∩ Ic), i.e.,
the out-neighbours of v are either not vulnerable or they are
vulnerable, but not in the in-component of S . Thus, bk =
(ck)k, where ck is the probability that an out-neighbor of an
out-degree-k node is in the setVc ∪ (V ∩ Ic).
To calculate ck, we note that an out-neighbor of a type ( j, k)
node is a ( j′, k′)-type node with probability P j′k′Q j′k/P−j′Q
+
k .
The probability that a ( j′, k′)-type node is not vulnerable is 1−
Γ j′k′ . The probability that a ( j′, k′)-type node is vulnerable, but
does not belong to the in-component is Γ j′k′bk′ = Γ j′k′ (ck′ )k
′
.
Thus, combining all probabilities together and summing over
the possible types of nodes we get
ck =
∑
j′,k′
(
Γ j′k′ (ck′ )k
′
+ (1 − Γ j′k′ )
) P j′k′Q j′k
P−j′Q
+
k
. (19)
Hence, c¯ = {ck} can be found as a fixed point of Eq. (19),
which we re-write in vector form as c¯ = {hk(c¯)}. Note that
the equation c¯ = {hk(c¯)} has a trivial fixed point e¯ = (1, 1, . . . )
that corresponds to the set I being empty. We now verify that
the cascade condition ‖D‖ > 1 is equivalent to the condition
that e¯ is an unstable fixed point, in which case there will be
a nontrivial fixed point 0 ≤ c¯∞ < e¯. A sufficient (and almost
necessary) condition for e¯ to be an unstable fixed point is that
‖D˜‖ > 1 where the derivative D˜kk′ = (∂hk/∂ck′ )|c¯=e¯ is given by
D˜kk′ =
∑
j′
k′Q j′kP j′k′Γ j′k′
Q+k P
−
j′
(20)
One can verify directly that
D˜ =
(
ΛBAΛ−1
)T
, D = AB
for matrices
A jk =
Qk j
Q−j
, B j′k =
j′P j′kΓ j′k
P+k
, Λkk′ = δkk′kP+k
and from this it follows that the spectra, and hence the spectral
radii of D˜ and D are equal. Hence ‖D‖ > 1 if and only if
‖D˜‖ > 1.
As long as the cascade condition is satisfied, the cascade
frequency f is approximately the lower bound given by the
fractional size of the in-component I:
f &
∑
k
(1 − (ck)k)P+k . (21)
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we consider two examples of stylized inter-
bank networks and show that the analytical results obtained
above match well to the Monte Carlo simulations when N, the
number of nodes in the network, is sufficiently large. Unless
specified otherwise, we adopt the choice of parameters made
for the model of Ref. 5:
γ jk = γ := 0.035; w j =
1
5 j
.
A. A Simple Random Network Model
We consider networks constructed with nodes of types
(3, 3), (3, 12), (12, 3), (12, 12) and edges of the same types. For
parameters a ∈ [0, 0.5] and b ∈ [0, 0.2] the following P and Q
matrices are consistent and specify a network with an average
node degree z = 7.5:(
P3,3 P3,12
P12,3 P12,12
)
=
(
0.5 − a a
a 0.5 − a
)
,
(22)(
Q3,3 Q3,12
Q12,3 Q12,12
)
=
(
0.2 − b b
b 0.8 − b
)
.
We first fix the value of a to be 0.5, which means that the in-
and out-degrees of all nodes are negatively correlated: nodes
with in-degree 3 have out-degree 12, and vice versa. We ex-
amine three different values of the parameter b: the indepen-
dent connections case b = 0.16, the near maximally positive
assortative case b = 0.01 and the near maximally negative as-
sortative case b = 0.19. Note that the independent edge con-
dition has been assumed in all previous work on such prob-
lems. We also note that with b = 0, edges have maximally
positive assortativity and link nodes of out-degree 3 to nodes
of in-degree 3 only, and nodes of out-degree 12 to nodes of
in-degree 12 only. In this case, the network consists of two
disconnected components.
We vary the net worth γ over the range 0 to 0.1, while the
initial shock distribution is taken to be ρ(0)jk = 1/N for all types
( j, k), corresponding to the shocking of a single randomly-
chosen bank.
Figure 5 compares theory curves for cascade size (found
by iterating Eqs. (9)–(8) to convergence) as well as the cas-
cade frequency given by Eq. (21) with results from numer-
ical simulations on random networks with N = 104, 103
and 200 nodes. The node correlation parameter is fixed at
a = 0.5, while the edge correlation parameter takes the val-
ues b ∈ {0.01, 0.16, 0.19}. Results are plotted as functions of
the net worth parameter γ. In each case, 500 realizations are
used to find the extent of global cascades (a global cascade
is defined, similarly to Refs. 5 and 6, as one in which more
than 5% of nodes default), and the frequency with which such
global cascades occur. As expected, the analytical approach
accurately predicts the size of the global cascades. Some dis-
crepancies may be noted in Fig. 5, where the theory does not
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FIG. 5. Numerical simulation results (symbols) and theoretical re-
sults (curves) for the random network model of Eq. (22), on net-
works of N nodes with parameter a = 0.5, as functions of the net
worth γ. The average size and frequency of global cascades in simu-
lations are shown by red circles and blue crosses, respectively. The-
oretical results for the expected cascade size (black solid curve) are
from Sec. III A; those for the frequency of cascades (dashed magenta
curve) are from Sec. III C. Each column shows results for a different
network size N, and the parameter b takes a different value on each
row of the figure. Since the (dashed magenta) frequency curves are
independent of N they are only shown in the first column.
predict some global cascades, but note that these occur with
only very small frequencies.
The cascade condition (17) predicts that the critical values
of the cascade buffer parameter γ are: γc = 0.017 for the pa-
rameters of Fig. 5(a), and γc = 0.067 for the case of Fig. 5(b).
These values match very accurately to the locations of the dra-
matic transitions in the theory curve (and in the expected size
of cascades in numerical simulation): for γ values in excess
of γc global cascades are extremely rare, while for values less
than γc the entire financial system is likely to fail following a
single bank’s default. These result indicate the potential use-
fulness of the cascade condition as a measure of systemic risk.
In Fig. 6, we consider the dependences on (a, b) of various
theoretical quantities in the infinite N limit. In the top panels,
the critical value of γ and cascade size are seen to be discon-
tinuous, and certainly not related to edge-assortativity (which
is monotonic in b). On the other hand (see bottom panels),
the frequency of cascades is continuously varying, and does
appear to correlate to some extent with the graph assortativity
coefficient r given by Eq. (3). We observe in the two scatter
plots of Fig. 7 that in this model r is a better purely graph
theoretic predictor of systemic susceptibility than rQ.
FIG. 6. Figure showing how various theoretical quantities of the
network defined by Eqs. (22) depend on the parameters (a, b). Top
left: critical γ value. Top right: Expected size of cascades (from
Sec. III B) when γ = 0.05 and ρ(0)jk = 10
−4. Bottom left: the graph
assortativity parameter r. Bottom right: frequency of cascades (from
Sec. III C) when γ = 0.05.
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FIG. 7. Scatter plots showing the correlation between the cascade
frequency and r (left panel) and rQ (right panel) for the example
shown in Fig. 6. Each point represents a pair of (a,b) values (taken
uniformly at random from the range shown in Fig. 6), for which we
calculate the cascade frequency and r (left panel), or the cascade
frequency and rQ (right panel). Note that r is a better predictor of
cascade frequency than rQ in this example.
B. Hierarchical Banking Network
It is known that small banks often tend to be net lenders in
the interbank sector, while large banks tend to be net interbank
borrowers. One also expects small banks to have few counter-
parties while large banks have many. In Fig. 8, we sketch a
proposed stylized interbank network with banks divided into
three tiers: small Tier-3 banks, medium Tier-2 banks and large
Tier-1 banks. We suppose that Tier-3 banks typically do not
borrow from other banks, and deposit their excess funds in one
or two Tier-2 or Tier-1 banks. Tier-2 banks may borrow from
two or three Tier-3 banks and one or two Tier-2 banks, while
they lend (deposit) to several Tier-2 or Tier-1 banks. Finally,
we suppose that Tier-1 banks borrow from a handful of Tier-3
banks, several Tier-2 and Tier-1 banks. Note that one needs
our assortative model to represent a tiered interbank network
sketched in Fig. 8, as the previously developed models5 are
unable to do so. The following P and Q matrices realize these
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FIG. 8. Sketch of a directed assortative interbank network defined
by Eqs. (23) and (24). The network consists of 3 tiers of banks. The
connections among tiers are shown by the thick arrows and represent
possible paths for the spread of defaults. The default of Tier-3 banks
cannot cause any further bank defaults because Tier-3 banks have 0
out-degree. Tier-2 banks can cause the default of Tier-2 and Tier-3
banks. The default of a Tier-1 bank may lead to the default of banks
in any tier. Tier-1 banks consist of nodes of types (3,10) and (5,16),
Tier-2 banks of nodes (2,3) and (4,4), and Tier-3 banks of nodes (1,0)
and (2,0).
characteristics in our model:
k : 0 3 4 10 16
40 0 0 0 0 
j = 1
30 10 0 0 0 j = 2
P jk =
1
100
0 0 0 5 0 j = 3
0 0 10 0 0 j = 4
0 0 0 0 5 j = 5
(23)
k : 0 3 4 10 16
0 9 12 11 16 
j = 1
0 18 24 22 32 j = 2
Qk j =
1
240
0 0 0 6 12 j = 3
0 9 12 11 16 j = 4
0 0 0 10 20 j = 5
(24)
Here the column index corresponds to possible out-degrees
k ∈ {0, 3, 4, 10, 16} and the row index corresponds to pos-
sible in-degrees j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. For example, P1,0 = 0.4
means 40% of nodes have in-degree 1 and out-degree 0, and
Q2,4 = 0.1 means 10% of edges start from nodes with our-
degree 4 and end at nodes with in-degree 2. The Tier-1 banks
are composed of types (3,10) and (5,16) nodes, Tier-2 banks
of types (2,3) and (4,4) nodes, and Tier-3 banks of types (1,0)
and (2,0) nodes. One can check that the row and column con-
straints Q−j = jP
−
j /z, Q
+
k = kP
+
k /z are satisfied with mean
degree z =
∑
k kP+k =
∑
j jP−j = 2.
It will be instructive to compare the default cascades on
such hierarchical network with cascades on its edge uncorre-
lated version, i.e., on a network where in and out degrees of
an edge are independent. Thus, in the edge uncorrelated case,
Qk j factorizes as
Qunck j =
jP−j kP
+
k
z2
, (25)
and using the values from Eq. (23) one obtains
k : 0 3 4 10 16
0 24 32 40 64 
j = 1
0 48 64 80 128 j = 2
Qunck j =
1
800
0 9 12 15 24 j = 3
0 24 32 40 64 j = 4
0 15 30 25 40 j = 5
(26)
Observe that unlike (24), (26) allows edges between all banks,
irrespective of their degrees, so there is no hierarchical struc-
ture of Fig. 8 in this case.
We consider directed networks generated according to P
matrix (23), and Q matrix (24) for edge correlated, or (26) for
edge uncorrelated case. For simplicity, we assume as before
that the default buffer γ is the same for all nodes, and link
weights are given by 1/(5 j), where j is the link in-degree.
We consider scenarios under which a single bank becomes
defaulted, thereby initiating a cascade of defaults.
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FIG. 9. Results for network defined by Eqs. (23) and (24) (left pan-
els) and its uncorrelated version defined by Eqs. (23) and (26) (right
panels). Initially a single bank chosen at random from the network
of N = 12000 nodes is defaulted. To obtain analytical results we
set ρ0jk = 1/N (for all j and k). Top panels show the analytical and
numerical results for the expected size of global cascades and their
frequency versus the default buffer γ. Bottom panels show numeri-
cally calculated distributions of cascade sizes for different values of
default buffer γ. To obtain numerical results we averaged over 104 re-
alizations of random seeds, and a global cascade occurs if it occupies
over 5% of the network.
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In Fig. 9 (top panels), we plot analytical and numerical re-
sults for the expected size of global cascades and their fre-
quency versus the default buffer γ. The analytical results for
the frequency and the expected cascade size were obtained us-
ing Eq. (21) and Eqs. (9)-(8) respectively. In general, our the-
ory predicts numerical results quite well. However, for some
values of γ, the cascade size is not captured accurately by the
theory in the correlated case shown in Fig. 9(a). This is be-
cause Eqs. (9)-(8), as many other theoretical approaches, as-
sume infinite network size, which is not the case here. Hence,
for some parameters the theory may not perform well on finite
systems16–18.
In the bottom panels of Fig. 9, we show numerical distribu-
tions of cascade sizes for three different values of γ: 0, 0.045,
and 0.06. When γ is sufficiently small, all nodes are vulnera-
ble (i.e., their default will trigger the default of all downstream
nodes) and the distribution of cascade sizes is exactly the dis-
tribution of out-component sizes. Therefore, the results for
γ = 0 represent the distribution of the fraction of nodes that
can be reached starting from a randomly chosen node. Inter-
estingly, for γ = 0 and γ = 0.045 we see peaks at around 35%
for correlated networks in Fig. 9(c), but these peaks are absent
for edge-uncorrelated networks in Fig. 9(d).
For γ = 0, the approximately 0.12 weight at 35% cascade
size in Fig. 9(c) is mainly due to Tier-2 seeds. Tier-2 seeds
cannot cause the default of Tier-1 banks because of the hierar-
chical structure of the network (see Fig. 8), and the resulting
cascade size is 35%, which is the size of the giant compo-
nent of Tier-2 and Tier-3 subgraph. The 100% cascades in
Fig. 9(c) can be triggered exclusively by a Tier-1 seed node
because only Tier-1 nodes can have the entire network as their
out-component (see Fig. 8). A Tier-1 node triggers a relatively
large number of defaulted edges, that almost certainly results
in a 100% cascade. (With very small probability a Tier-1 seed
can result in no cascade, e.g., when it is connected exclusively
to Tier-3 nodes, or lead to a 35% cascade, e.g., when it is
connected only to Tier-2 nodes.) There are 10% Tier-1 nodes
in the network, and hence 100% cascades have probability of
approximately 0.1 in Fig. 9(c). Likewise, the main contribu-
tion to the 0.78 no-cascade peak in Fig. 9(c) is made by Tier-3
(sink) nodes which take 70% of the network. The extra 0.08
weight to the no-cascade peak is due to Tier-2 nodes which
hit exclusively Tier-3 (sink) nodes, and hence fail to trigger a
cascade.
Summarizing the above, the three peaks observed in
Fig. 9(c) appear because of the hierarchical structure of the
interbank network, encoded in the edge-correlation matrix Q
of Eq. (24). This implies that (i) Tier-3 nodes never trigger a
cascade, (ii) only Tier-1 seeds can trigger 100% cascades, and
(iii) within the subnetwork of Tier 2 and 3 nodes, there is a
giant component which occupies 35% of the network; some
but not all Tier-2 seeds hit this component.
By comparing the frequency and expected cascade size
shown on left and right panels of Fig. 9, we see that the edge-
correlated interbank structure is more resilient to defaults than
the edge-uncorrelated one. This example is of interest to fi-
nance, because it shows a new type of robust fragility. Only
big banks can bring the entire system down, while medium
banks can trigger their subnetwork to collapse. This type of
behaviour cannot be observed in edge-uncorrelated models5.
V. CONCLUSION
In summary, we have described here an analytical frame-
work which can predict the systemic risk of a networked sys-
tem of financial institutions. The qualitative type of networks
one can address has been extended compared to most existing
work, in particular by the inclusion of the non-independent
connections between nodes. In this more general setting we
find the cascade is described by a vector-valued fixed point
problem that reduces to well-understood scalar problems in
special cases. We also observed that graph assortativity can
strongly affect the course of contagion cascades, and hence
showed the importance of incorporating assortativity in nu-
merical and analytical treatments of banking network models.
Our analytic framework will enable extensive studies of alter-
native network topologies. In such studies the cascade condi-
tion and cascade frequency provide two easily computed and
useful measures of systemic risk by which to compare dif-
ferent network topologies. However, the daunting range of
network variables means that both analytical and numerical
studies must be carefully framed to address specific issues,
for example, to uncover other key determinants of systemic
risk. Finally, we anticipate that future work can show how the
approach described here may be further extended to include
partial recovery models (such as Ref. 19) and stochastic bal-
ance sheets.
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